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MoneroResearch.info |
Resource type: Manuscript BibTeX citation key: Babb2025 View all bibliographic details |
Categories: Monero-focused Creators: Babb, Goodell, Parker, Salazar, Slaughter, Szramowski Collection: Cypher Stack |
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Attachments
frostlass.pdf |
URLs https://github.com/cypherstack/frostlass |
Abstract |
Over the past decades, especially since Shamir’s secret sharing and Shoup’s threshold signatures, ([10], [11]) research into threshold and multiparty cryptographic schemes of different flavors has become fashionable. In [2], for example, Bellare and Neven famously proposed a framework to formalize multisignatures and to prove them secure with the generalized forking lemma.
The general forking lemma, which goes back at least to [8], is useful in proving a wide variety of modern cryptographic schemes secure, including ring signatures preceding [12] and the bulletproofs zero-knowledge proving system proposed in [3]. Concise linkable spontaneous anonymous group (CLSAG) signatures, proposed in [5] and built from the (LSAG) signatures from [9], are Schnorr-like ring signatures used in the Monero cryptocurrency protocol. A naive thresholdization of CLSAG signatures, called thring signatures, was proposed in [4], building off of the linkable spontaneous anonymous group (LSAG) signatures , which are used in the Monero cryptocurrency protocol. The FROST approach to thresholdizing Schnorr signatures, first described in [7], is sufficiently flexible to work for CLSAG signatures, and are superior to the thring signatures of [4]. An opinionated Rust implementation of every major component of the Monero protocol at [6], written by Luke Parker (kayabaNerve), contains an implementation of FROSTLASS. Herein, we formalize FROSTLASS, present a novel definition of linkability, and prove FROSTLASS strongly unforgeable up to the hardness of the κ-one-more discrete logarithm problem, and statistically linkable. |