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Rösler, P., Schambach, K., & Thomas, J. (2026). Atomic Swaps with Relaxed Assumptions. {IACR} Communications in Cryptology, 3(1). 
Added by: Rucknium (16/11/2026, 17:00)   Last edited by: Rucknium (16/11/2026, 17:01)
Resource type: Journal Article
DOI: 10.62056/abe0ivol7
ID no. (ISBN etc.): 3006-5496
BibTeX citation key: Rosler2026
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Categories: Monero-focused
Creators: Rösler, Schambach, Thomas
Collection: IACR Communications in Cryptology
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Attachments   3-1-22.pdf [0/0] URLs   https://cic.iacr.org/p/3/1/22
Abstract
Atomic swaps allow two parties to exchange coins across blockchains without trust. Most existing solutions support a 1-to-1 transaction; however, the value ratio of two cryptocurrencies is usually not 1-to-1. In addition, these solutions often rely on blockchains with explicit support structures for atomic swaps, typically hashed timelocks (HTLCs) or smart-contract scripting. Thyagarajan et al. (SP'22) provide a solution for n-to-m swaps utilizing adaptor signatures instead, which offer better privacy for the participants. Significantly, all these approaches need timed transactions or a similar substitute on both sides, but not every blockchain supports timed transactions. Hoenisch et al. (ESORICS'22) demonstrate a concrete swap procedure between Bitcoin and Monero, where only one side needs timed transactions. We build upon both of these ideas to provide a generic solution for any blockchain, where only one side needs timed transactions.

We introduce a generic adaptor-signature protocol for n-to-m swaps. In doing so, we minimize assumptions compared to current solutions. Both sides lock their coins in shared (two-party signature) addresses, where they can only access the coins together. To prevent deadlocks, both parties are able to refund their coins from these addresses with pre-signed transactions. Our solution works with all relevant blockchains because it needs only standard signatures and a joint public key. Further, only one side needs timed transactions, and if each party acts in its best interest, there are two possible outcomes: If progress stalls, the side with timelocks refunds after a certain time, and the other side refunds immediately. Otherwise, one party redeems the other party's coins with pre-signed transactions, and the other party completes the swap after a timeout to prevent race conditions. We prove security in the universal composability framework and show privacy preservation via unlinkability and fungibility. 


Added by: Rucknium  
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